We propose a hybrid approach to temporal anomaly detection in user-database access data -or more generally, any kind of subject-object co-occurrence data. Our methodology allows identifying anomalies based on a single stationary model, instead of requiring a full temporal one, which would be prohibitive in our setting. We learn our low-rank stationary model from the high-dimensional training data, and then fit a regression model for predicting the expected likelihood score of normal access patterns in the future. The disparity between the predicted and the observed likelihood scores is used to assess the "surprise". This approach enables calibration of the anomaly score so that time-varying normal behavior patterns are not considered anomalous. We provide a detailed description of the algorithm, including a convergence analysis, and report encouraging empirical results. One of the datasets we tested is new for the public domain. It consists of two months' worth of database access records from a live system. This dataset will be made publicly available, and is provided in the supplementary material.
Introduction
Consider a security analyst examining user access logs of a large database system. A blatant security breach might involve a user with insufficient clearance attempting to access a restricted database table. However, there could be more subtle indicators of suspicious activity, such as users accessing database tables that are atypical of their past behavioral pattern, or at unusual times. Moreover, in a distributed attack, perhaps no single user has done anything particularly out of the ordinary, but the general pattern of access to different database tables is atypical in terms of frequency, time of day, etc.
The difficulty stemming from the nebulous definition of potentially suspicious activity is compounded by the fact that severe anomalies, by their very nature, are extremely rare occurrences, and when the goal is to learn to identify them, we generally do not expect the available training data to contain any examples. Furthermore, due to the large number of users and database tables in a typical system, a naive solution, which classifies all previously unseen access events as anomalies, will tend to trigger many false alarms. The latter issue is exacerbated further by the problem of provided in the form of binary access matrices indicating accesses over one-hour-long intervals. The full dataset will be made publicly available, and is provided in the supplementary material.
Related Work
Intrusion detection methods can be roughly clustered into two main categories: rules-based and learning-based methods [Santos et al., 2014] . This paper deals with the latter, in a temporal setting. Temporal analysis [Lee et al., 2000 ] models the timing and frequencies of user accesses to the database. Approaches based on dependency and relation analysis look for a systematic redundancy in the event co-occurrence log [Chung et al., 1999 , Kamra et al., 2008 . Sequence alignment methods [Srivastava et al., 2006] seek common sequences of events, then monitor the system behavior by checking for repetition of these sequences. Some methods gather various statistical information about the user accesses to the database, and use it to model the normal behavior [Spalka and Lehnhardt, 2005, Mathew et al., 2010] . Lee et al. [2002] analyzed SQL patterns in such an application. These approaches are inapplicable to our setting, since they rely on sequential data, while we have only aggregated data from each time interval.
The problem of change-point detection, while not strictly a subset of anomaly or intrusion detection, is of some relevance to the temporal setting [Takeuchi and Yamanishi, 2006 , Tartakovsky et al., 2006 , Höhle, 2010 , Khaleghi and Ryabko, 2012 . A natural approach is to model the temporal process via a Markov or Hidden Markov Model, as was done in Görnitz et al. [2015] . These approaches, however, cannot be feasibly applied to our setting, because of the high dimensionality of the aggregated access matrices. Additionally, our data is aggregated over time intervals rather than being sequential, which precludes a clean application of Markovian techniques. Lakhina et al. [2005] employ a low rank concatenation of entropy matrices for every feature at different intervals, achieved by PCA. Chan et al. [2003] , Das and Schneider [2007] , Das et al. [2008] use a variant of association rules based on groups to detect anomalies. The main disadvantage of association rules in our context is the inability to cope with new instances.
Our use of low-rank matrix completion in the context of anomaly detection appears to be novel. However, the technique is well-established in areas of semi-supervised learning and collaborative filtering (e.g., Srebro et al. 2004 , Mazumder et al. 2010 , Sindhwani et al. 2010 , Shamir and Shalev-Shwartz 2014 , Hsieh et al. 2015 .
Our approach
To detect anomalous access patterns, we begin by defining a probabilistic model for normal access patterns. Our approach is based on learning a baseline low-rank stationary model, and then modeling the deviation of the temporal model from the stationary one. This approach enables learning and detection using a feasible number of parameters. Denote the number of different users by n and the number of different objects by m. For simplicity of notation we fix m and n, however in practice they need not be known to the algorithm in advance. We assume that the data is provided as a sequence of consecutive time intervals, where for each time interval t an access matrix B t ∈ {0, 1} n×m is provided, where B t (i, j) = I[user i accessed object j]. The length of a time interval is an application-specific parameter.
The goal of the algorithm is to assign an anomaly score to each new access matrix B t which is observed after the training phase. Quite generally, the distribution of B t might be modeled using a matrix π t ∈ [0, 1] n×m , where π t (i, j) is the probability that user i accesses object j during time interval t, and different entries in B t are assumed statistically independent. Thus, at time interval t, any possible observation matrix G ∈ {0, 1} n×m would be assigned a probability of
This model allocates a separate set of parameters for each time interval, and is incapable of extrapolating beyond past observations. Hence, we instead posit a single baseline matrixπ ∈ [0, 1] n×m , which approximates a stationary (time-independent) distribution. This matrix can be thought of as a rough approximation of π t for all time intervals t. It induces a distribution on observation matrices in a manner analogous to Eq. (1):
. This model is similar to the one proposed in Davenport et al. [2014] for a non-temporal variant of matrix completion from probabilistic binary observations. We take the standard approach of assuming that π is low-rank, motivated by the intuition that the relevance of a user to an object can be explained by a small number of latent factors (see, e.g., Su and Khoshgoftaar [2009] , Sindhwani et al. [2010] , Leskovec et al. [2014] ).
Having obtained an approximationπ toπ based on the training set, we can calculate the log-likelihood of an observation matrix G at time interval t, as induced by the parametersπ:
At this point, one might consider assigning time interval t an anomaly score based on the value LL(B t ,π), where B t is the actual matrix observed at time t: a lower log-likelihood value would indicate a higher anomaly level. The problem with this proposal is that it is likely that some time intervals will systematically exhibit behavior that deviates significantly from that ofπ, and these systematic deviations should not be classified as anomalies. For instance, it is expected that access patterns will differ between night and day, weekdays and weekends, holidays and workdays, and so on, as well as being affected by application-specific circumstances. Thus, if the application monitors a software company's database accesses, scheduled days of major version updates will likely have patterns different from other days. Thus, we need some way of accounting for systematic, non-anomalous, differences between time intervals.
We address this issue by proposing a compromise between the overly constraining stationary model defined byπ and the overly rich model in Eq. (1). Our approach is to model the similarity between π t andπ in terms of properties of the time interval t. This similarity can be formalized using the cross-entropy betweenπ and π t . Recall that the cross-entropy between two discrete distributions p, q is H(p, q) := − i p i log(q i ). For two distributions defined as above by matrices
where H Ber (a, b) for a, b ∈ [0, 1] is the cross-entropy between the distributions Bernoulli(a) and Bernoulli(b). The expected value of the measured log-likelihood score LL(B t ,π) satisfies
Therefore, if the actual log-likelihood score LL(B t ,π) is far from −H(π t ,π), this can be considered an anomalous behavior. The value of H(π t ,π) cannot be computed, since π t is unknown.
Instead, we train a predictor in order to estimate it. Each time-interval t is represented by a vector v t ∈ R d of d time-dependent real-valued features, such as time-of-day, day-of-weak, day-ofmonth, auto-regressive features (such as the log-likelihood in a previous interval) and possibly application-specific features (such as a binary indicator major-version-delivery). Using these time dependent features, we fit a linear regression model v t → ŵ, v t parametrized byŵ ∈ R d , where LL(B t ,π) ≈ ŵ, v t on the training set.
1 We then define the anomaly score of a new observed time interval t by
This approach enables identifying anomalous behavior, while avoiding many of the false-alarms resulting from normal differences between time intervals. Lastly, we address the issue of cold-start [Su and Khoshgoftaar, 2009] . So far, we have assumed that each user and object appears at least once in the training data. This is unlikely in many scenarios. For instance, in the database-access setting, new employees and new database tables can be added over time. If the application monitors an open environment such as a public web site, then the users and objects modeled inπ could be a small minority of the set of users and objects observed during the deployment of the system. We address this issue by applying a process commonly known as folding (e.g., Deerwester et al. [1990] , Manning and Schütze [1999] ) to incorporate the new users or objects into the model on the fly.
In the next section we give a detailed account of the full anomaly detection algorithm.
The Algorithm
We describe the two phases of the algorithm: the training phase and the anomaly-detection phase.
In the training phase, the algorithm has access to a training set S = (B 1 , . . . , B T ), where B t are binary access matrices of consecutive time intervals. The algorithm splits the training set into two parts, S 1 = (B 1 , . . . , B T1 ), S 2 = (B T1+1 , . . . , B T ). S 1 is used to find an estimatorπ for the probabilistic stationary modelπ, as described in Section 4.1. S 2 is used to fit the log-likelihood regressorŵ. The full training phase is given in Section 4.2. In the anomaly-detection phase, an access matrix is provided as input for each time interval, and the algorithm outputs an anomaly score for each such matrix using Eq. (2). The system could now present a ranking of all the intervals by anomaly score in a specific time frame, or display the top few, as specified by the desired user interface.
For simplicity of presentation, we describe the two phases under the assumption that no new users or objects appear after the modelπ is estimated. We explain in Section 4.3 how the algorithm can be seamlessly adapted to handle new users or objects.
The most computationally expensive step in the algorithm is the SVD procedure in Alg. 1 below, which, naively, is cubic in the matrix dimensions. However, since in many applications the matrices are sparse, a sparse SVD algorithm could speed up computation (e.g., Larsen 2000) . All other procedures are linear in m and/or n, as should be clear from context. Below we use several matrix norms. For a real-valued matrix A ∈ R m×n , denote the nuclear (trace) norm by A tr = i σ i , where σ i are the singular values of A. Denote the Frobenius norm by
Denote the spectral norm of by A sp = max σ i .
1 Central to this approach is the assumption that anomalous intervals are very rare, and so the model is trained almost exclusively on non-anomalous behavior.
Estimating the matrix model
Our probabilistic estimation problem in the first part of the training process is to estimate a low-rank probability matrixπ based on the sequence of matrices S 1 = (B 1 , . . . , B T1 ), where B t records accesses in time interval t. In our simplified probabilistic model, the B t are assumed to be drawn i.i.d. according to some low-rank matrixπ. As discussed in Section 3, this i.i.d. assumption is a deliberate simplification, which ignores possible time-dependencies in the probabilistic model.
Our probabilistic model, and our low-rank assumption onπ, are similar to those studied in Davenport et al. [2014] , Hsieh et al. [2015] . However, in these works it is assumed that only one access matrix drawn fromπ is available, while we have several matrices available at training time. A standard approach for finding a low-rank estimate [Fazel, 2002] is to minimize the mean-squared error of the matrix difference, and regularize using the trace norm, which is a convex relaxation of the low-rank constraint:
Here λ > 0 balances the trade-off between fidelity to B and the low-rank structure. Existing generalization bounds [Davenport et al., 2014 , Shamir and Shalev-Shwartz, 2014 , Hsieh et al., 2015 give guarantees for the mean-squared-loss of the solution to the optimization problem in Eq. (3), for the case where B is a single matrix drawn according toπ. Our approach to finding the low-rank structure is similar to the above, however instead of considering a single binary matrix B, we use the average matrixB = 1 T1 T1 t=1 B t . In Appendix A in the supplementary we prove a generalization bound for F (B, λ), which converges to the true low-rank model as T 1 increases.
An efficient solution to the unconstrained version of Eq. (3), withπ ∈ R n×m , is given in Mazumder et al. [2010] : For a real-valued matrix A, let SVD(A) be the Singular Value Decomposition of A. Let r be the rank of the matrixB, and let (U, D, V T ) = SVD(B). Mazumder et al. [2010] show that
where
In practice, Shamir and Shalev-Shwartz [2014] observed that the solutions to Eq. (4) typically nearly satisfy the constraintπ ∈ [0, 1] n×m , with few values slightly outside [0, 1]. For these values, they propose a simple clipping to fit them into [0, 1] . This approach reportedly results in solutions that are very similar to those obtained by solving the full constrained minimization; this matches our empirical observations. Hence, we follow the same approach. The full procedure for finding a model matrixπ given a regularization parameter λ and a training set S is given in Alg. 1.
Note that while in the rest of our algorithm we use log-likelihood as a measure of fit between the modelπ and the observed matrix B t , in Eq. (3) the Frobenius norm is used instead, and our generalization bound, given in Appendix A, bounds the mean-squared error. The reason is two-fold: first, as evident in our analysis, the Frobenius norm lends itself to a stable low-rank matrix approximation because of its Lipschitz property. Such a property does not hold for the loglikelihood loss near zero. Second, optimizingπ based on the log-likelihood requires significantly more computational resources. In particular, because of the sensitivity of the log-likelihood near 0, optimizing this objective without constraints tends to push the solution far outside the [0, 1] range, and clipping no longer helps. Instead, one is faced with solving a much more heavily constrained optimization problem, which presents a prohibitive computational cost for a run-of-the-mill system. Our experiments show that despite this apparent mismatch between the loss functions, the empirical results are promising. In future work, we plan to study efficient methods for directly optimizing the log-likelihood.
The full training algorithm
In the first step of the training algorithm, the value of the regularization parameter λ is selected by cross-validation, where the selected λ is the one that maximizes the average log-likelihood score of the matrices in the validation set. Then, the selected λ is used to find the estimateπ. Recall that for this step, the first part of the training set, S 1 , is used.
A set of values Λ is initialized for cross validation. We used the set
, where K was selected adaptively, by identifying when further decreasing λ did not improve the log-likelihood on the validation set.
2. k-fold cross validation (e.g., k = 10) is performed to select λ ∈ Λ: In fold i, S 1 is divided to a training part S t 1 (i) and a validation part S v 1 (i), and a modelπ λ (i) is calculated bŷ π λ (i) ← FindModel(λ, S t 1 (i)). The score of λ is set to the average
3. The regularization parameter is set to λ * ← argmax L(λ).
The estimated model is set toπ
Having found a model estimateπ, the second learning step is to find a regressor for predicting the expected log-likelihood for a time interval t.
A training set {(v t , y t )}
T t=T1+1 for regression is calculated from S 2 as follows:
(a) The vector of time-dependent features v t is calculated using the definition of the features for t (e.g., time-of-day, day-of-weak, etc.) (b) y t ← LL(B t ,π).
2.ŵ is calculated by empirical least-squares:ŵ ← argmin w∈R
The outputs of the training phase areπ andŵ, whereπ is given as a low-rank matrix decomposition U, S, V of some rank k, where U ∈ R n×k , S ∈ R k×k , V ∈ R m×k , S is diagonal, andπ = U SV T .
Unseen objects: cold start
In the algorithm description above, we avoided the issue of users or objects that are observed for the first time only after the first phase of training, that is, afterπ has been estimated. Such new elements might be observed for the first time during the regression phase, or later during the deployment phase, as anomaly scores are being computed. In the context of collaborative filtering, this issue is commonly known as the cold start problem [Su and Khoshgoftaar, 2009 ]. In our setting, the challenge is to assign likelihood scores to matrices B t which include new rows or columns that do no appear inπ. Previous solutions to the cold start problem in the context of collaborative filtering have suggested finding an existing user whose pattern of accesses most resembles that of the new user, and assigning the new user the same prediction as the existing user or a weighted score of the most similar users [Shardanand and Maes, 1995] . Our setup is slightly different, since we are not attempting to predict the values of specific matrix entries. Our solution relies on similar ideas but adapts them to our setting. To calculate the log-likelihood of a matrix B t which includes rows or columns not present inπ, we calculate a new version ofπ which extends to these rows and columns. The process is based on finding similar users/objects in latent space, the low-rank space spanned byπ.
Each new user or object is projected onto latent space, via a process commonly known as folding [Manning and Schütze, 1999] . Then, we find its nearest neighbor in the existingπ, based on the distances in latent space. Finally, we assign the new row/column the same probability vector as its nearest neighbor. Using distances in latent space carries two advantages: first, these are less liable to overfit. Second, this allows storing and searching over smaller matrices, instead of the original training matrixB, which is usually significantly larger.
More formally, letB 1 = 1 T1 T1 i=1 B i ∈ R n×m be the matrix representing the aggregate access data from the training set S 1 . Letπ = U SV T be the rank-k model estimated in the first step of the training phase. Let G =B 1 V ∈ R n×k and H =B T 1 U ∈ R m×k . Let G i be the i'th row in G, and let H j be the j'th row in H. These are the latent representations of user i and object j from B 1 , respectively. Alg. 2 gives the procedure FoldedLL for calculating the folded log-likelihood of a new observation matrix B t , assuming for simplicity that all new users/objects appear in the last rows/columns of B t and its dimensions are n , m . The training algorithm and the procedure for assigning an anomaly score, described above, can be easily adapted to handle cold start, by replacing LL in the regression learning step and in the anomaly score step with FoldedLL. It should be noted that this approach will not work if the observed time interval has no shared users or objects with the modelπ, or very few of them. A possible remedy is to attempt to identify when this situation is about to occur, and to retrain the stationary modelπ. We leave this issue to future work.
Experiments
We tested our algorithm on several datasets. The first dataset is TDA, described in Section 1, and provided in the supplementary material. TDA depicts accesses of users to a database in one-hour intervals over a two-month period. Here, each object is a database table. The other two datasets are the movie-rating datasets NetFlix [Netflix, 2009 , Bennett et al., 2007 and MovieLens [Harper and Konstan, 2016] . The rating time stamps were used to generate the aggregated time-interval matrices. Here the objects are movies, and an access occurs when a user rates a movie. None of the available datasets contained known anomalous accesses. Thus, to evaluate the success of Algorithm 2 FoldedLL(B t ,π, G, H, U, V ) 1:π fold ←π 2: for Each row u l in B t , for l ∈ {n + 1, . . . , n } do 3:
Append row i ofπ fold to the end ofπ fold . 6: end for 7: for each column v l in B t for l ∈ {m + 1, . . . , m } do
Append column j ofπ fold to the end ofπ fold . 11: end for 12: Return LL(B t ,π fold ) our algorithm, we injected anomalous behavior into random intervals, as explained below, and checked the percentile of the anomaly score of the anomalous interval, compared to the score of other intervals in the test data. A perfect result for the anomalous interval would be the maximal percentile of 100%. The results of our algorithm are compared to a baseline algorithm, which uses an anomaly score based only on the deviation from the mean log-likelihood in the regression training set, without adjusting for temporal differences using regression. This algorithm is labeled MEAN in the plots. Table 1 specifies the dataset paramters. For Netflix we used the timespan between 11-Mar-99 and 19-Apr-04, since data was incomplete for later periods. For Movielens we used years 2010 to 2014, inclusive. The following time-dependent features were used for regression: A binary "weekend" feature, the log-likelihood of the previous interval and of the one 24 hours ago, the number of total accesses in the current interval, and the length of time (in time-interval units) since the time of the last interval in the training set S 1 . In addition, in TDA we used the hour of the day h ∈ {1, . . . , 24} and the shifted hour h + 12 mod 24. In Netflix and Movielens, we used a day-of-the-week feature.
Dataset
Interval intervals users × objects |S 1 | |S 2 | test-set users × objects length in dataset size inπ Accuracy of regression We plot, for each dataset, the true log-likelihood of each test interval against the predicted log-likelihood based on the learned regressorŵ. A straight diagonal line would indicate a perfect prediction. We observe that the regression-based prediction is quite successful for these datasets, indicating that the use of a linear regressor here is reasonable. The plots and the correlation coefficients (ρ) are provided in Figure 1 (Top). Random accesses In this experiment, an anomalous interval was simulated by adding random accesses to a random test interval: Each bit in the interval's access matrix was changed to 1 with an independent probability of > 0. The average anomaly score percentile of our algorithm and MEAN, over a 100 random experiments, against the value of log 10 ( ), are plotted in Figure 1 (Bottom). The regression model improved the identification of the anomaly in a wide range of noise levels.
Accesses at an anomalous time In this experiment, we simulated a behavior which is normal at one time, but possibly anomalous at a different time: two random intervals t 1 and t 2 were selected from the test set, and we set B t1 ← B t2 . We repeated this experiment 100 times. Table 2 lists the percent of changed intervals that were identified in the 95% anomaly percentile or above. The full distribution of both algorithm's outputs is provided in Figure 2 . The histograms depict the percent of anomalous intervals in each anomaly score percentile, in the MEAN algorithm and in our algorithm. Indeed, our algorithm identifies a significant proportion of the intervals as anomalous, while the baseline algorithm does not. Note that we do not expect a 100% success here: if t 1 and t 2 happen to have a similar pattern, e.g., they are at the same hour of the day, the new B t1 should not be considered anomalous.
Table 2: Percent of tested intervals which were assigned an anomaly score above the 95% percentile. 
A Convergence analysis
For two real-valued matrices X, Y ∈ R n×m , define the mean squared error between X and Y by
Recall thatπ is the assumed stationary model, whileπ is our estimate of that stationary model. Below we show that by finding F (B, λ) , as defined in Eq. (3), we are effectively minimizing MSE(π,π) up to a term that decays to zero. Eq. (3) minimizes the squared Frobenius norm π − B 2 F with an additional regularization term λ π tr . This is equivalent to minimizing
Therefore,
where C is a constant independent ofπ. By a similar derivation, for another constant C independent ofπ,
is a good proxy for minimizing MSE(π,π). We prove a more general claim, which bounds the diffrence between the empirical loss and the true loss of a general Lipschitz loss, which we define below. Our result generalizes a result from Hsieh et al. [2015] to the case of a training sample with several matrices. The proof employs techniques from Hsieh et al. [2015] and Shamir and Shalev-Shwartz [2014] .
Let
with an analogous definition for the second argument. For a matrix X ∈ [0, 1] n×m and a distribution P over matrices [0, 1] n×m ; denote the true loss of X by (X,
The theorem below gives a guarantee for L-Lipschitz losses. Note that for the squared-loss := MSE, where MSE(x, y) := (x − y) 2 , is 2-Lipschitz in both arguments: For x, x , y ∈ [0, 1],
Thus the theorem below holds for the MSE loss with L = 2, proving that as the size of the training set grows, minimizing Eq. (3) converges to a minimization of MSE(π,π) with high probability. In the following theorem and proof, we use c to indicate a universal constant, whose value can change from line to line. 
Note that the sample S has T nm independent (though not identically distributed) entries. Thus, we upper-bound ψ(S) with high probability using McDiarmid's inequality [McDiarmid, 1989] , which states that if for every two samples S, S which differ by a single entry, |ψ(S) − ψ(S )| ≤ α, then
T nmα 2 .
To bound α, consider two samples, S, S , where the matrices in S are denoted B t and the matrices in S are denoted B t . Suppose that S differs from S by a single entry (i, j) in the matrix B to , such that B to (i, j) = 1 and B to (i, j) = 0. We have Setting the latter to δ 2 , we obtain that with a probability of at least 1 − δ 2 ,
i,j ] = T . To bound the 4th moment, we appeal to Khinchine's inequality [Boucheron et al., 2013, Exercise 5 .10], which states that E[ν An analogous argument yields the same bound for (π, S) − (π, Dπ), which implies the statement of the theorem via a union bound.
